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Abstract:  After  the fall of the  communist regimes  in the  Southeast  European
countries, what  was  attempted  was  a systemic transformation  which  was  called
transition.  The economic  transition aimed  at transforming the nature of economic
relations,  since  their  coordination would  be passed from  the  state to market
mechanisms. In order to enable this transformation, what was necessary was  to
finance the attempted changes. However, since the countries in the region lacked
sufficient equity capital, they resorted to foreign borrowing and, thus, international
finance  has  to  date  been  the  main  source  of  capital.  The  involvement  of
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the transition process was almost direct
but after the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo in 1999 there has been a dramatic
increase in financing throughout the area. The level of financing in conjunction with
the  immediate  and  increasing  needs  of  countries  was  the  main  factors  that
configured  the  balance  of  powers  among  recipient  countries  and  international
financial  institutions.  The  implementation  of  financial  policies  by  Institutions  is
being conducted by means of specific financial instruments.
The  present  article  aims  at  examining  and  evaluating  the  instruments
used by institutions to  finance the  transition of  Southeast European countries,
as their suitability, orientation and philosophy have been repeatedly questioned. In
order to make this assessment feasible, an examination will take place with regard
to the financial instruments of the major creditors of the region, namely the IMF
(International  Monetary  Fund) the  World  Bank  Group and the  European Union,
who are also managers of the vast majority of financings.
Keywords: transition,  international  financial  institutions  (IFIs), Southeast Europe,
financial instruments
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1. INTRODUCTION
The  financing  of the transition  process  regarding Southeast European countries was
principally based on international finance. The financial policies of the International Financial
Institutions are initiated and implemented through the financial instruments introduced by the
relevant body within the region of southeast Europe.
†
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†Following the demarcation of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for Southeast Europe, the States will
be studied are Albania, the former Federal Republic of Serbia - Montenegro (including Kosovo) (S-M), theMaria-Eleni VOUTSA
The present paper, through studying the financial instruments of International Financial
Institutions for Southeastern Europe as well as the financing provided by the countries of the
region, will attempt to examine their structure and to determine the suitability and the degree
of their effectiveness. For this purpose, the finance and the financial instruments of the main
creditors of the region will be examined, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World Bank Group (WBG) and the European Union (EU).
The above institutions manage the vast majority of finance in the area and the use of
financial instruments is directly related to the associated conditionalities of their financial
policies. Their almost direct involvement in the transition process determined the key aspects
of the attempted transformation so that the financing towards the Southeast European states
exhibits specific common characteristics
‡
The  methodology chosen for  the  analysis that  follows is descriptive research  with
qualitative analysis and critical review of content sources. The collection of data and data on
financial flows in the study area was based primarily on reports and publicly evidence of
international funding institutions and secondarily in the international literature.
At first, studied the financial tools used by each institution in the region of Southeast
Europe and also plotted, with the greatest accuracy, the financial flows for each country in
Southeast Europe separately. The next chapter is devoted to the description of the effort for
the systematic organization of international finance with the creation of joint actions to form a
more integrated approach. Finally attempts a brief recording the options of institutions in
relation to the direction of funding, the philosophy governing the implementation of programs
and the final use of funding by the recipient countries.
2. THE  FINANCIAL  INSTRUMENTS  OF  THE  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
It was in 1999 that the IMF established its new financial program “Poverty Reduction
and  Growth  Facility”  (PRGF) for  its  poorest member-states, which replaced the previous
financial instrument called “Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility” (ESAF), (IMF 2002a).
The credit support of the policies arising from this program does not come from the General
Resources Account (GRA) but by the PRGF-ESF Fund, which is financed by 93 members of
the Organization and the IMF is its Commissioner.
Within the scope of its implementation, more favorable financial conditionalities are
being adopted, emphasis is placed on economic aspects of governance and the possibility of
incurring adverse effects by the implementation of various reforms is being recognized. In an
effort to promote support measures that will mitigate the social impact, the countries are
enabled to fail to meet certain conditionalities or to implement a more flexible policy within their
compliance. Although this approach constitutes an implicit acceptance, on the part of the Fund, of the
social impacts  caused  by  its  implemented  policy, this program  concerns  a  very special group  of
countries, which consists of only two Balkan countries, Albania and FYROM (Tables 1&2).
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and the Bosnia – Herzegovina
(B-H).
‡ For a detailed description of the theoretical framework and the characteristics of funding from IFIs to the
chantries of South East Europe see Voutsa, M.-E., 2010, Assessment and Evaluation of the Results Obtained by
Finance  Policies  of  International  Financial  Institutions  (IFIs)  in  the  Transition  Process  of  the  Southeast
European Countries in The Economies of the Balkan and Eastern Europe Countries in the Changed World edited
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The loans given to the SE European states mostly come from the financial policies of
‘Stand-By  Arrangement’ and  the  ‘Extended  Fund  Facility’. Within  the  ‘Stand-By
Arrangement’, the interested state contracts agreements with the IMF, which enable it to draw
a certain amount from the General Resources Account for an agreed period, usually up to 2
years, if  it meets the conditionalities determined by  the supporting  arrangement
accompanying the 'Stand-By Arrangement’,( Xatzimixail and Voutsa 2009).
The ‘Extended Fund Facility’ finances three-year programs to support countries so as to
confront the difficulties arising in the balance of payments as a result of the macroeconomic
and structural problems that a country has been facing. In this case, the country is obligated to
state the overall objectives of the three-year period and the policy applied during the first
year, while the policies for the following years are specified in the program reviews. Loan
crediting, in this case as well, is drawn by the General Resources Account, (Xatzimihail and
Voutsa 2009).
The states of the region exhibit significant differentiations with regard to the agreed
amounts of their loans. Bulgaria and Romania have contracted agreements with the largest















Stand-By Agreement 31/8/2005 30/8/2008 51.675.000 10.500.000
Stand-By Agreement       30/4/2003 15/8/2004 20.000.000 20.000.000
Stand-By Agreement 29/11/2000 22/11/2001 24.115.000 1.148.000
Extended Fund
Facility
18/12/2000 22/11/2001 10.335.000 1.723.000
Extended Credit
Facility
      11/4/1997 10/4/2000 54.560.000 27.281.000
Stand-By Agreement 5/5/1995 4/6/1996 22.300.000 22.300.000
TOTAL SDRs 182.985.000 82.952.000
TOTAL US DOLLARS 289.116.300 131.064.160
DISBURSEMENT RATE 46%
    Source: IMF, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the IMF, History of Lending Arrangements,
processing & calculation Voutsa (2008).
















1/2/2006 31/1/2009 8.523.000 4.870.000
PRGF Commitments 1/2/2006 31/1/2009 8.523.000 4.870.000
PRGF Commitments 21/6/2002 20/11/2005 28.000.000 28.000.000
PRGF Commitments 13/5/1998 31/7/2001 45.040.000 45.040.000
PRGF Commitments 14/7/1993 13/7/1996 42.360.000 31.060.000
Stand-By Agreement 26/8/1992 14/7/1993 20.000.000 13.125.000
TOTAL SDRs 152.445.000 126.965.000
TOTAL US DOLLARS 240.864.000 200.605.000
DISBURSEMENT RATE 84%
Source: IMF, Albania and the IMF, History of Lending Arrangements, processing & calculation Voutsa (2008).Maria-Eleni VOUTSA
amounts of financing compared to other countries in the region (Tables 4 &7). However, on
the basis of the duration of the loan agreement, Serbia-Montenegro holds first position since
in less than a year (2001-2002) it borrowed an amount exceeding 1.3 billion $ (Table 5). The
disbursement rates also seem diversified since Croatia disburses only 5% of its total loans
(Table 6), while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro have both disbursed 100% of
their  total financing (Tables  3&5).  There  are  usually two  principal causes for  the  non-
disbursement of money. Either the IMF stops its lending program due to failure to comply
with the conditionalities on the part of the receiving country or the country chooses not to
proceed with the disbursement of the money. In such a case and if the disbursed amount is
very  small, as in  the case  of Croatia, this happens  because the country usually  contracts
agreements with the IMF with the aim of increasing its credibility within the international
financial and investment environment and not because they aim at using the entire loan














Stand-By Agreement 2/8/2002 29/2/2004 67.600.000 67.600.000
Stand-By Agreement 29/5/1998 29/5/2001 94.420.000 94.420.000
TOTAL SDRs 162.020.000 162.020.000
TOTAL US DOLLARS 255.991.600 255.991.600
DISBURSEMENT RATE 100%
Source: IMF, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the IMF, History of Lending Arrangements,
processing & calculation Voutsa (2008).












Stand-By Agreement 6/8/2004 31/3/2007 100.000.000 0
Stand-By Agreement 27/2/2002 15/3/2004 240.000.000 240.000.000
Extended Fund
Facility
25/9/1998 24/9/2001 627.620.000 627.620.000
Stand-By Agreement 11/4/1997 10/6/1998 371.900.000 371.900.000
Stand-By Agreement 19/6/1996 11/4/1997 400.000.000 80.000.000
Stand-By Agreement 11/4/1994 31/3/1995 139.480.000 116.240.000
Stand-By Agreement 17/4/1992 16/4/1993 155.000.000 124.000.000
Stand-By Agreement 15/3/1991 14/3/1992 279.000.000 279.000.000
TOTAL SDRs 2.313.000.000 1.838.760.000
TOTAL US DOLLARS 3.654.540.000 2.905.240.800
DISBURSEMENT RATE 80%
Source: IMF, Bulgaria and the IMF, History of Lending Arrangements, processing & calculation  Voutsa (2008).The financial instruments used by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the Southeast
European countries: a critical assessment of their underlying philosophy and orientation























19/3/2001 18/5/2002 200.000.000 0
Extended Fund
Facility
12/3/1997 11/3/2000 353.160.000 28.780.000
Stand-By
Agreement
14/10/1994 13/4/1996 65.400.000 13.080.000
TOTAL SDRs 823.440.000 41.860.000
TOTAL US DOLLARS 1.301.035.200 66.138.800
DISBURSEMENT RATE 5%
  Source: IMF, Republic of Croatia and the IMF, History of Lending Arrangements
      processing & calculation Voutsa  (2008).














Stand-By Agreement       7/7/2004 6/7/2006 250.000.000 0
Stand-By Agreement    31/10/2001 15/10/2003 300.000.000 300.000.000
Stand-By Agreement 05/8/1999 28/2/2001 400.000.000 139.750.000
Stand-By Agreement 22/4/1997 21/5/1998 301.500.000 120.600.000
Stand-By Agreement 11/5/1994 22/4/1997 320.495.000 94.265.000
Stand-By Agreement 29/5/1992 28/3/1993 314.040.000 261.700.000
Stand-By Agreement 11/4/1991 10/4/1992 380.500.000 318.100.000
TOTAL SDRs 2.266.535.000 1.234.415.000
TOTAL US DOLLARS 3.581.125.300 1.950.375.700
DISBURSEMENT RATE 55%
 Source: IMF, Romania and the IMF, History of Lending Arrangements, processing & calculation Voutsa (2008).
.

















14/5/2002 28/2/2006 650.000.000 650.000.000
Stand-By
Agreement
11/6/2001 31/5/2002 200.000.000 200.000.000
TOTAL SDRs 850.000.000 850.000.000
TOTAL US DOLLARS 1.343.000.000 1.343.000.000
DISBURSEMENT RATE 100%
  Source: IMF, Republic of Serbia and the IMF, History of Lending Arrangements,
processing & calculation  Voutsa (2008).Maria-Eleni VOUTSA
2.2 THE WORLD BANK GROUP
Between  1995 and 2005 the World  Bank Group has  been  financing countries
throughout the region with approximately 10 billion $ through its various programs (Table 8).
In 2000, the Bank defined the areas and objectives of its action regarding South East Europe
by means of the Regional Strategy Paper; In order to support the implementation of reform
programs in each country it created the ‘Country Assistance Strategy’ (CAS). Based on the
assessment of each  country’s priorities,  its past  performance and its creditworthiness,  the
‘Country  Assistance  Strategy’ sets  out strategic priorities and determines  the level  and
composition of financial and technical assistance to be offered by the Bank in each case. What
constitutes a key pillar supporting the ‘Country Assistance Strategy’ is Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Their primary purpose is to improve the living standards of the
weaker social layers through the active participation of the private sector and civil society.
In order to achieve the objectives of the Regional Strategy Paper in 2002, the World
Bank and  the European Commission decided to coordinate and inform  each  other in  the
preparation and evaluation of the ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ on the part of the Bank
and ‘Country Strategy Papers’ on the part of the European Commission (Voutsa, 2011). The
‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ are being compiled by the governments in cooperation
with the WBG and the IMF (Joint Office Reports 2008). As a consequence of the direct
involvement of the IMF in this process, conditionalities are imposed on the financing arising
from this program. In the joint review of the IMF and the WBG (2001-02) the question raised
was that of the alignment of all financial benefits and financial strategies, from whatever
institution they  may  come  from with certain  conditionalities which are  included  in  the
‘Poverty Reduction  Strategy  Papers’.  Some  examples  of the programs and financial
instruments that should be aligned with specific conditionalities are the following:
 the IMF program ‘Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth’,
 the WBG programs ‘Country Support Strategy’ and (Poverty Reduction Support Credits
(PRSCs)), and
 the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), (IMF 2002b, Voutsa
2011)





1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ALBANIA (IDA) 66 125 60 28 88 43 58 62 728
Β-Ε (IDA& IBRD) 206 163 38 124 102 23 98 57 1429
BULGARIA (IBRD) 104 161 221 102 - 268 150 150 1468
CROATIA (IBRD) 125 108 29 19 202 53 209 86 1206
FYROM (IDA &IBRD) 82 122 - 67 35 - 55 25 632
ROMANIA (IBRD) 332 340 113 130 60 486 230 709 3396
S-Μ (IDA) - - 41 24 178 234 125 129 731
TOTAL 783 1019 502 494 665 1107 925 1218 9590
Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, What is the Role of the World Bank ?
http://www.seerecon.org/gen/wbrole & World Bank –IMF Paper,
Building  Peace  in  South  East Europe  Macroeconomic  Policies  and  Structural  Reforms  Since  the  Kosovo
 Conflict, 2001, processing & calculation  Voutsa (2008).
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2.3 THE EUROPEAN UNION
The EU is the largest financier of the Western Balkans and one of the biggest for the
total countries throughout the region with total financing approaching 10 billion $ between
1991-2005 (Tables 9& 10). The EU action in the former socialist countries was inaugurated
through the PHARE  program, which was  created in 1989 and designed to  support the
transition of  Poland and  Hungary. After the Essen  European  Council  in  December 1994,
PHARE was turned into a financial instrument of the pre-accession strategy aiming at the
ultimate accession of the ten associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) in
the Union. Subsequently, the program was extended to the Western Balkan countries while, in
accordance with the provisions of Agenda 2000, it was gradually transformed into a fund of a
structural  kind, aiming  at boosting economic growth. As  a  result,  a large proportion  of
investments were being financed by the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development and
the European  Investment  Bank. Among the beneficiaries of the  program are Bulgaria,
Romania  and Croatia. Over the years, it  was  realized  that  the PHARE  did not cover the
specific needs of countries in the region as it was designed for Eastern Europe.
After the Zagreb summit, the  Stabilization  and  Association  Process  (SAP)  has
constituted a key policy lever for SE Europe, introducing a new regulatory framework for
financing through the CARDS program, which replaced all previous financing programs. The
Stabilization and Association Process is the cornerstone of the EU policy in the region. It aims
at promoting stability by facilitating the establishment of closer relations with the Union.
The countries  making satisfactory economic and political progress  contract a  formal
relationship with the EU in the form of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).




1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
ALBANIA 368,13 70,15 75,25 97,90 54,30 205,24 41,29 44,50 956,76
Β-Ε 495,47 216,38 442,42 360,86 295,25 233,95 115,83 131,78 2.291,93
CROATIA 204,86 38,74 33,56 26,96 24,14 18,63 19,62 61,48 427,99
FYROM 101,52 34,43 25,00 58,71 40,48 108,61 47,07 85,75 501,57
S-Μ 170,62 39,95 24,47 18,13 37,24 384,01 798,71 899,27 2.372,39
 Source: ΕΕ, Cards Regional Annual Action Programme /Financing Proposal, 2002, processing & calculation
Voutsa (2008).
Table 9: The distribution of the CARDS program 2000-2006 (in million €)
COUNTRY YEAR TOTAL
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ALBANIA 33.4 37.5 44.9 46.5 63.5 44.2 45.5 315.5
Β-Ε 90.3 105.2 71.9 63.0 72.0 49.4 51.0 502.8
CROATIA 16.8 60.0 59.0 62.0 81.0 - - 278.8
FYROM 13.0 56.2 41.5 43.5 59.0 45.0 40.0 298.2
S-Μ 650.3 385.5 351.6 324.3 307.9 282.5 257.5 2559.8
 Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, Status of SEE countries' relations
 with the EU, www.seerecon.org/gen/eu-see.htm .Maria-Eleni VOUTSA
The Union and the World Bank actions have to date been established by the Stabilization and
Association Process and the conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council (2003) (EC
2008). In  2005 the  European Commission  presented  the revised enlargement package,




3. conditionality ( Xenakis and Tsinisizelis 2006).
The  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) which was adopted for the period
2007-2013  constitutes a new program of  financial support for  the  enlargement  and is
estimated to keep the Union among the top financiers to the Western Balkan area. It provides
for the stricter application of conditionality through the suspension of financing in case there
is no satisfactory progress in meeting the accession criteria or if the beneficiary country does
not proceed to the commitments it has undertaken within the framework of its partnership
with the EU (Xatzimihail and Voutsa 2009).
3. THE SYSTEMATIC ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
In 1995, after the Dayton Agreement, and particularly after the cessation of hostilities in
Kosovo in 1999 there has been a dramatic increase of financing in the region of southeast
Europe. The  international  community,  recognizing the risk  of  conflicts  being extended  to
sensitive areas of Europe, seeking to halt a potential mass immigration wave and recognizing
the escalating negative impacts of war on the economy of all countries in the region, decided
to intensify efforts so as to curb the downside.
In  order  for the action of  institutions  to be  effective, the creation  of a structured
approach was supported. In 1999, after an EU initiative, the Stability Pact for the countries of
Southeastern Europe  was created, which provides  a  framework for  cooperation  aiming  at
consolidating regional stability and the smooth integration of countries into the EU. It was
created  through  collaboration  among  states, international  organizations  and development
institutions (Council of Europe, EU, OSCE, EBRD,  IMF, WBG) and its  main task  is to
provide assistance to SE European countries (including Moldova) on promoting structural
changes and adjustments in the institutional, political, social and economic sector.
At a structural level, the Pact is divided into three Working Tables (Table 11). Most
actions of the first and third bank are mostly financed by the EU and secondarily by bilateral
financiers and the WBG. The bulk of  the financing  is directed  toward purely economic
aspects of transformation by  putting  on  the  back  burner  the socio-political sectors of
transition.
The systematic organization of international action, which the pact attempts, includes
the field of finance as well by promoting a delineation of the appropriate context within which
it is proposed that financiers and recipient countries move. The World Bank and the European
Commission, under Article 41 of the Stability Pact, are authorized to act as coordinators of
the entire assistance to SE Europe (Joint Office Report 2001). This authorization was based
on  the  already very  close  cooperation developed  between the two  institutions  so  as to
implement their policies in the region. In 1999 they founded the Joint Office for South-East
Europe with the main aim of organizing their coordinating role, facilitating their cooperation,
promoting international assistance and monitoring finances. In 2002 the Office decided to
direct  all International Financial  Institutions towards implementing various aspects and
parameters of the Stabilization and Association Process (World Bank, IMF 2001).The financial instruments used by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the Southeast
European countries: a critical assessment of their underlying philosophy and orientation
The Pact does not explore in detail neither the financial policies which will be followed,
nor the conditions which will accompany them. A clear description of the objectives which
the finance should meet is being presented into the Regional Strategy  Paper
§, which was
compiled  jointly by the  WBG and the  European Commission in 2000  (Xatzimihail and
Voutsa 2009). The paper presents a detailed description of the formed situation for each
country and proposes a series of solutions to the problems they are facing. These solutions are
possessed by a spirit of generalization in relation to the proposed policies and measures that
the countries  are  required  to take. In  particular,  as  far  as  the socio-political  issues of
development and transition  are  concerned,  the  description  of  the current situation is  not
accompanied  neither by proposals  for measures  addressing these  issues,  nor  by  the
proportional amounts of assisting reforms, except for the EU (Table 12).
The data available on financing South Eastern Europe until 1999 and after 2006 are
fragmentary, so it is not possible to achieve a comprehensive and clear picture of financial
flows and programs throughout the transitional period for all countries. The establishment of
the Joint Office in 1999 and the publicization through a series of data allows for a more
complete recording of  financial flows at  least  for the period 1999-2005 during which an
increasing capital inflow is exhibited in the region, which in 1999 exceeded 5,5 billion € and
in 2005 it is estimated  to have reached 7.3 billion € (Joint Office Report 2007), (Table 13).
According to the data available, the countries that have benefited most from financing,
in absolute terms, are Romania and Bulgaria (Tables 21-25). But if the assistance provided is
examined as a GDP rate, it arises that the Western Balkans, with the exception of Croatia, are
ranked first (Diagrams 1-7). Over the period 2001-2005, these states have on average been
financed with amounts which every year amount to 4.5% of their GDP, while for the same
period the total annual average for the region does not exceed 3,5%.
§ Full name of the paper “Τhe Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe: A Regional Strategy
Paper”.
Table 11: The thematic organization of the Stability Pact
1st WORKING

















 State of justice
 Minority rights
 Mass Media freedom
 refugees

























      Source:  Stability  Pact  for  South  Eastern  Europe, About  the  Stability  Pact,
http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp.Maria-Eleni VOUTSA
Table 13: International financing for South East Europe (Billion €)
South East Europe* Donors















































** Not including the IMF
*** Estimations
Source: Voutsa, M.-E.,  2010, Assessment  and  Evaluation  of  the  Results  Obtained  by  Finance  Policies
of International  Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the Transition Process of the Southeast European Countries
in  The  Economies  of  the  Balkan  and  Eastern  Europe  Countries  in  the  Changed  World  edited  by
Karasavvoglou, A., pp.251-271, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. .












Private Sector Support Χ Χ Χ IMF, WBG,
EU, EBRD
Trade Liberization Χ Χ Χ WBG, EU
Improvement of
Economic System
Χ Χ Χ IMF, WBG, EU
Agricultural Sector Χ ---- Χ EU, WBG
Poverty Reduction &
Social Development






Χ ---- Χ EU
Redefinition of State
Operations so that they
respond to market
needs





Χ ---- Χ EU
Empowerment of the
Judicial System
Χ ---- Χ EU
Reduction of
Corruption
Χ Χ Χ EU
Infrastructures Χ Χ Χ EU, EBRD
Environment Χ Χ Χ EU
Source: Europe and Central Asia Region, The World Bank, Τhe Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern
Europe: A Regional Strategy Paper, 2000, categorization: Voutsa 2010.The financial instruments used by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the Southeast
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Diagram 2: Financing of Bosnia – Herzegovina as a percent of GDP
Β-Ε











Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe,
processing & calculation Voutsa (2011).
Diagram 1 : Financing of Albania as a percent of GDP
ΑΛΒΑΝΙΑ











Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation
Voutsa (2011).Maria-Eleni VOUTSA
Diagram 3: Financing of Bulgaria as a percent of GDP
ΒΟΥΛΓΑΡΙΑ











Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing &
calculation Voutsa (2011).
Diagram 4: Financing of Croatia as a percent of GDP
ΚΡΟΑΤΙΑ











Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing &
calculation Voutsa (2011).The financial instruments used by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the Southeast
European countries: a critical assessment of their underlying philosophy and orientation
Diagram 5: Financing of FYROM as a percent of GDP
ΠΓΔΜ











Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation
Voutsa (2011).
Diagram 6: Financing of Romania as a percent of GDP
ΡΟΥΜΑΝΙΑ











Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation
Voutsa (2011).Maria-Eleni VOUTSA
4. THE  UNDERLYING  PHILOSOPHY  THE  ORIENTATION  AND  THE
UTILIZATION OF THE FINANCING
The underlying philosophy and the orientation of funding to the countries of Southeast
Europe have been influenced by the shape of the theoretical model of transition. The primary
principles which guided the transition are summarized under the umbrella term ‘Washington
consensus’ and a key role in the ‘Washington  consensus’ is played by the New Political
Economy, which constitutes the dominant ideology within the financing processes. According
to this, market mechanisms can function as regulators of the economic system as long as they
remain unaffected by political interference.
The result is that institutions face the state as the problem of development and display
the free market as the solution. The ‘structural adjustment loans’ of the WBG marked the
beginning of the practical implementation of the above philosophy, followed later by the IMF
with the ‘structural adjustment policy’, which has been established as the primary method of
its financing.
The adequacy of this approach began to be reviewed since the mid 90s (Makris and
Voutsa 2006). Main reason was apparently operating inhibitors in development but could be
explained  by  the  New  Political  Economy.  The  countries  of  the  area  failed  to  reach  the
promised levels of prosperity so that the institutions can adopt, at a theoretical level at least, a
diversified approach to development by putting more emphasis on social factors affecting it
(World Bank 2001).
The “post-Washington Consensus”, which was proposed as a term descriptive of the
new development policy, not contributed towards substantial change. In fact, the theoretical
framework was not different but it was merely updated and completed by modernising the
neoclassical  model,  continuing,  however,  to  treat  development  and  the  transition  as  a
technical problem (Voutsa 2011). The free market mechanisms and the private sector keep
having a leading role. The new components concern the implementation of more and more
stringent conditionalities as well as the increase in the influence of institutions on domestic
policy making (Table 14).
Diagram 7:  Financing of Serbia- Montenegro as a percent of GDP
Σ-Μ











Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing &
calculation Voutsa (2011).The financial instruments used by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the Southeast
European countries: a critical assessment of their underlying philosophy and orientation
Table 14: Key fields of action, proposed policies and conditionalities through the implementation
of the “Washington consensus” and the “post-Washington consensus”
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Source: Voutsa, M.-E.,  2010, Assessment  and  Evaluation  of  the  Results  Obtained  by  Finance  Policies
of International  Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the Transition Process of the Southeast European Countries
in  The  Economies  of  the  Balkan  and  Eastern  Europe  Countries  in  the  Changed  World  edited  by
Karasavvoglou, A., pp.251-271, Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
With  this  theoretical  framework  and  despite  the  increased  requirements  posed  by
International Financial Institutions for the release of funds and continuation of funding, there
is inefficiency in the recipient countries to absorb and manage funds.
The  incomplete  and  problematic  legislation  in  conjunction  with  the  “bureaucratic
rigidity”  of  the  public  sector,  in  many  cases  rendered  financing  and,  by  extension,  the
absorptive capacity of the countries ineffective, (UNECE, 1999). Poor design and planning
have contributed to squandering the assistance on projects of dubious quality and utility. The
EU Court of Auditors in a relevant report characterised half of the pre-accession assistance to
Romania and Bulgaria (1.9 billion €) as problematic (Voutsa 2011).
Market failures and phenomena of corruption and shadow economy act as catalysts in
the effective utilisation of funds the International Financial Institutions argue that the design
and implementation of financial plans can be made more effective without the participation of
local actors. This perception has been described as the “nirvana fallacy” (Coyne, 2006). In
ignorance of the characteristics that should be taken into account, the institutions formulate policies
and tools that are not designed to function properly and implemented in the environment of each
country.The financial instruments used by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the Southeast
European countries: a critical assessment of their underlying philosophy and orientation
This  practice  hinders  the  implementation  of  financial  policies  since  a  country's
commitment is not enough for their successful implementation but what is needed is a wider
framework  of  cooperation,  which  cannot  be  achieved  without  constructive  dialogue.
Furthermore, the absence of a strong social contract, which would act as a breakwater against
the turbulences of transformation by facilitating the smooth operation of the countries, caused
irreparable damage to the social capital of the countries (Xatzimixail and Voutsa 2009).
The International Financial Institutions treated countries in the region as a tabula rasa,
ignoring completely the 'initial conditions' and placing unilateral emphasis on the economic
aspects of transition. This treatment essentially led to a double distortion in the transition
process. On the one hand, they  completely ignored the structural transformation that was
necessary in order to support the operation of market economy and, on the other hand, the
serious  structural  weaknesses  along  with  the  considerable  institutional  insufficiencies
impeded the transition process (Voutsa 2011).
The fundamental principle which the promoted model was based on entailed that every
economic action can be explained by the rational, individualist and materialistic behaviour of
persons. But this approach ignores the fact that individuals and, by extension, societies do not
act  as  perfect maxi  misers  as  they  do  not  aim  at  maximising  but  at satisfying  instead,
(Zoumboulakis and Kyriazis 2009).
5. CONCLUSION
The total financing to Southeastern European states in the form of loans and grants and
independently  of  its kind (technical, humanitarian,  investment, budget support, macro-
economic support) has placed SE Europe on top of areas with the highest per capita financing
since the total amounts correspond to more than 100 € per capita a year on average (Tables
15-19).
However, the amount of financing cannot  by  itself guarantee the  success of
implemented policies. By the end of the 1990s, the financial instruments used to provide
assistance were not specialized, and properly adapted to the specificities of countries. The
modification of some of them and the effort to coordinate the provided assistance did not
make, at least to a high extent, financing better since the philosophy underlying its provision
has remained the same and cooperation focused mainly on the conditionalities of financing
and the technical parameters of the programs (Makris and Voutsa 2006).
While from 2006 and on a comparative laxity has been marked in joint efforts to finance
the region more effectively, the interweaving of financing coupled with its amount deprived
the area from alternative approaches and led to the adoption of a similar transitional model.
This model was drastically influenced by non-economic factors not included in the original
design and, as a result, the approach chosen was proved to be ineffective (Voutsa 2011).
The  speed  of  reforms  had  a  catalytic  impact  in  leading  the  transition  issues  and  is
directly related to the amount of funding. The choice of shock therapy maximized the social,
political and economic costs and not allowed to take account of criteria relating to the "initial
conditions",  the  particularities  of  each  country  and  the  logical  sequence  of  proposed
programs.What was ignored was the fact that countries are directly dependent on the path-
dependence. Once a set of rules, institutions and customs of a society have been established, it
is difficult and it requires great effort to change it.
The  conditionalities  eventually  undermined  the  effectiveness  of  the  financing  itself,
which  initially  functioned  as  a  formative  mechanism  of  the  transitional  framework  andMaria-Eleni VOUTSA
subsequently was used to cover the cost of the reforms introduced by the financial institutions
(Xatzimixail and Voutsa 2009).
The  neoliberal  model  which  was implemented  created  a  teleological  conception  of
transition. Through shock therapy, all states in the region were forced to implement a specific
procedure, as a sine qua non Treaty, which in  theory  would lead to the establishment of
democracies and to the smooth operation of market economy.
However,  the  main  question  is  not  whether  the  specific  development  model  was
appropriate for managing the transition process, but why they chose a development model in
order to implement the project of transition. The international financial institutions, having
established a series of development principles, rushed to apply them as a transitional model.
That is, in fact they did not study the creation of a policy framework that would correspond to
the  transition  process but  instead  they  used  a  development  model  in  order  to  manage
transition (Voutsa 2011).
It is worth noting that the EU policy is the only one which reflected a basic effort to
approach the socio-political parameters of the transition. At a theoretical level, it was through
the Maastricht Treaty which in Article 49 states that “any European State which respects the
principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as the rule
of law may apply to become a member of the Union” (European Union, 2008). Nevertheless,
in practical terms it is the only institution which finances, mostly through grants and not
loans, socio-political fields, associating them with the tightening of its relations to countries in
the region (Tables 12). It connects them with conditionalities and checks the expected results.
In practice the implementation of the attempted changes and the effectiveness of the
funding affected by the non-economic factors are associated with a number of issues which
are not taken into account in the selection of financial instruments, which cannot be assessed
in isolation, without considering the overall approach of the transition process adopted, as
they reflect the overall philosophy of the International Financial Institutions.

































Albania 160,45 64,79% 47,19 87,21 35,21% 25,65 247,65 72,84
Β-Ε 313,76 56,63% 78,44 240,32 43,37% 60,08 554,07 138,52
Bulgaria 384,26 55,75% 48,03 305,02 44,25% 38,13 689,28 86,16
Croatia 119,67 20,70% 29,92 458,59 79,30% 114,65 578,26 144,57
FYROM 217,08 53,27% 108,54 190,43 46,73% 95,21 407,50 203,75
Romania 699,57 41,99% 31,80 966,46 58,01% 43,93 1.666,03 75,73
S-Μ 715,44 53,54% 79,49 620,79 46,46% 68,98 1.336,23 148,47
Kosovo 495,91 99,82% 247,95 0,90 0,18% 0,45 496,81 248,40
Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation by Voutsa
(2008).The financial instruments used by international financial institutions (IFIs) regarding the Southeast
European countries: a critical assessment of their underlying philosophy and orientation































Albania 207,39 49,43% 61,00 212,16 50,57% 62,40 419,55 123,40
Β-Ε 303,04 60,55% 75,76 197,41 39,45% 49,35 500,44 125,11
Bulgaria 368,91 47,29% 46,11 411,18 52,71% 51,40 780,08 97,51
Croatia 130,80 15,89% 32,70 692,46 84,11% 173,11 823,26 205,81
FYROM 330,31 82,19% 165,16 71,55 17,81% 35,78 401,87 200,93
Romania 764,81 43,42% 34,76 996,80 56,58% 45,31 1761,61 80,07
S-Μ 691,46 50,85% 76,83 668,40 49,15% 74,27 1359,86 151,10
Kosovo 362,49 99,72% 181,25 1,00 0,28% 0,50 363,49 181,75
Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation by Voutsa (2008).

































Albania 140,95 47,65% 41,46 154,84 52,35% 45,54 295,79 87,00
Β-Ε 241,12 77,15% 60,28 71,41 22,85% 17,85 312,53 78,13
Bulgaria 420,14 43,13% 52,52 553,94 56,87% 69,24 974,07 121,76
Croatia 110,29 22,24% 27,57 385,53 77,76% 96,38 495,82 123,95
FYROM 188,65 45,68% 94,33 224,34 54,32% 112,17 412,99 206,50
Romania 784,81 33,04% 35,67 1590,20 66,96% 72,28 2.375,01 107,96
S-Μ 567,01 49,08% 63,00 588,35 50,92% 65,37 1.155,36 128,37
Kosovo 275,77 100,00% 137,88 0,00 0,00% 0,00 275,77 137,88
Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation by Voutsa (2008).
































Albania 163,72 40,34% 48,15 242,14 59,66% 71,22 405,86 119,37
Β-Ε 195,86 48,18% 48,97 210,66 51,82% 52,67 406,52 101,63
Bulgaria 567,37 56,22% 70,92 441,81 43,78% 55,23 1.009,18 126,15
Croatia 122,65 18,34% 30,66 546,29 81,66% 136,57 668,95 167,24
FYROM 155,03 56,49% 77,52 119,39 43,51% 59,70 274,42 137,21
Romania 1.023,09 59,23% 46,50 704,29 40,77% 32,01 1.727,39 78,52
S-Μ 587,61 54,81% 65,29 484,42 45,19% 53,82 1.072,03 119,11
Kosovo 172,48 97,18% 86,24 5,00 2,82% 2,50 177,48 88,74
Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation by Voutsa (2008).Maria-Eleni VOUTSA































Albania 115,20 41,33% 33,88 163,54 58,67% 48,10 278,74 81,98
Β-Ε 154,55 37,84% 38,64 253,90 62,16% 63,47 408,44 102,11
Bulgaria 645,24 58,38% 80,65 459,95 41,62% 57,49 1105,18 138,15
Croatia 136,82 20,71% 34,21 523,69 79,29% 130,92 660,52 165,13
FYROM 131,19 48,17% 65,60 141,17 51,83% 70,58 272,36 136,18
Romania 1116,59 37,87% 50,75 1831,60 62,13% 83,25 2948,19 134,01
S-Μ 371,14 35,38% 41,24 677,74 64,62% 75,30 1048,88 116,54
Kosovo 140,58 96,57% 70,29 5,00 3,43% 2,50 145,58 72,79
* Estimations
Source: Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, processing & calculation by Voutsa
(2008).
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